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Threatening to leave the eurozone may be Ireland’s only way
to break the link between its sovereign and bank debt.
by Blog Admin
Ireland faces a heavy fiscal and structural adjustment programme imposed by the Troika at the
same time as some EU countries insist that it continues to pay the debt of its failed banks. With
Spain now getting assistance for its banks under the European Stability Mechanism, Aidan
Regan argues that there are different rules for different eurozone countries. He writes that the
only way that Ireland may be able to achieve its objective of separating sovereign from bank
debt is to threaten to leave the monetary union.
If  Germany, the Netherlands and Finland insist that Ireland continues to pay the debt of  its
f ailed banks (and ref use to allow the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) to retrospectively take on this
responsibility) there can probably only be one rational response by the Irish: threaten to bring down the
house and pull out of  the eurozone.
Without getting into the nuances of  European level decision making there are f our reasons why this is the
case. Firstly, if  these countries are unwilling to accept the decision of  the European Council on June 29th
that Europe needs to break the link between sovereign and bank debt in individual member-states, they
have violated the rules of  the game (or implicit social contract that emerged f rom this meeting). These rules
are not written into hard legislation but they are premised on a gentleman’s agreement that Europe, as a
collective club, must help individual member-states, such as Ireland, to separate sovereign and bank debt.
This is absolutely necessary if  member-states are to develop the conditions f or economic and employment
recovery (which is good f or all Europeans).
Secondly, if  these countries – or more precisely their Finance Ministries – insist that 4.5 million people
continue to shoulder the burden of  private bank debt (which amounts to over €60bn and originates in a
complex web of  banking transactions within the EMU) without collective support f rom Europe, then no
amount of  pampering by the Irish government will f ix the problem. The Irish approach of  pampering stronger
states has f ailed to change their posit ion. Machiavelli in his excellent empirical study of  power games in
Europe during the 14th century (it is the 500 year anniversary of  the Prince this year) f amously stated that
there are only two ways f or polit ical leaders to deal with potential enemies: pamper them or destroy them.
The f irst has f ailed. Threatening (and being willing) to pull out of  the euro might f orce a bit of  self -
enlightenment among European leaders.
Thirdly, regardless of  whether Ireland gets a deal on its bank debt it will still require f inancial assistance
f rom the ESM when the current round of  f unding expires. Ireland, whilst being a member of  the Eurozone,
cannot access f inancial markets. Theref ore it will remain a non-sovereign economic country pursuing a
f iscal and structural adjustment programme that is imposed by the Troika (the European Commission,
European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund). This is dif f icult f or the government to sell to
the electorate as it is. It will be impossible f or any government to sell a Troika adjustment programme to
cit izens if  these same actors ref use to cut the link between sovereign and bank debt. Furthermore, as long
as the banking and sovereign debt is connected in Ireland, the prospect of  the f iscal adjustment programme
working declines. It is totally within the self - interest of  all Europeans to relieve Ireland of  its banking debt. In
recognition of  this, the IMF and ECB are probably f urious with the bargaining posit ion of  the Dutch, Finnish
and German governments.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it is completely inequitable to enable the ESM to take on the bank
debt of  Spain (and all European countries in the f uture) without retrospectively applying the same
conditions f or countries who took on their own bank debt at the beginning of  the crisis. The most basic
rule f or any society, association or club is that its members are guaranteed equal rights and conditions. An
association, such as the eurozone, that applies dif f erent rules f or dif f erent countries is not polit ically
sustainable. It will f eed into the rise of  populist polit ical parties. Double standards are illegit imate and
violate all common sense notions of  social justice. It is f or all of  these reasons that it would be perf ectly
legit imate f or Ireland to change strategy and drive a hard bargain.
There is nothing rational in accepting unwarranted pain, inequality, injustice or a violation of  the rules. It is
perf ectly rational to strike back at those who are inf licting it. One would be f orgiven theref ore if  the Irish
conf ronted the Dutch, Finnish and German governments with a strategy that will potentially destroy them
electorally. In the absence of  European solidarity a bit of  realpolitik is probably the only way the Irish
government will achieve their objective of  separating sovereign f rom bank debt, while simultaneously
f orcing Northern European governments to recognise what is really in their own interest.
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